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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
A.M. BELL,
Plaintiff and Respondent

vs.

PARLEY P. JONES,
Defendant and Appellatnt.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

LEON FONNESBECK,
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of-"Ui.;t~ i.n a~d for Cache County.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
A.M. BELL,
Plaimiff and Respun,den:l

vs.
PARLEY P. JONES,Defendant and Appellarnt.

Respondent argues that plaintiff was a holder in due
course and that the court erred in failing to so hold. Counsel says "there is no ditSpute in the evidence on

this

' ' 1.50. i>v
question, that Alfred J. Bell was owing plaintiff~
at
the time the note was turned over to the plaintiff, and that

plaintiff subsequently paid full value for the note." That
statement is all disputed.
Appellant objected (Tr. 12, Ab. 16) to the plaintiff's
conclusion that his father was indebted to him in the sum
of

fitu_o.do

~:50.

This i,s cited as error in assignment No. 6.

Such evidence was obviously self-serving, gave a mere ·conclusion on the part of the plaintiff the very conclusion
which the court should draw from the evidence.
"Witness will not be permitted to state a conclusion of law." 22 C. J. 634-39, and numerous
cases ·cited in note~s.
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Furthermore,. .w
· hen plaintiff. attempted to explain the

~~~0

~-he

'

'

took various·item·s from an old note book which

he claimed he had expended for his father or mother (Ab.
19, Tr. 23). Such evidence was equally objectionable. The
witness had even taken the liberty to write in his book,
after this suit was started, that some of these items were
"advanced for father". We submit that such self serving
evidence thus built up for the occasion is not worthy of
any ·consideration or belief, and should have been excluded by the court. 'The very fact that plaintiff had taken
the liberty, after

thi~s

suit was started, to add the notation

"advanced for father", (Ab. 19) clearly shows that these
items were not genuine obligations, and were not prior
thereto considered as a bona fide obligation from father

to son.
We have no quarrel with the rule that an existing
bona fide indebtedness is good consideration for a note.
But it must be real and actual past due debt.
"On the other hand, if there is no pre-ex~sting
debt, as where a note is given for money or property advanced by a parent to his child, or a note is
given to discharge a supposed liability where none
existed, there is no ·consideration. There is no consideration where the debt or obligation for which
a note is given ha8 already been discharged either
by the maker him~self or by a third person."
8 c. J. 216.
"It is****well settled that, if money i!S given as an
advancement, it cannot afterwards be made a debt. The
note of $2116.25 was really without any consideration, for
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from all the evidence it is perfectly clear that the father
intended to give his son the money when he paid it." Boblett vs. Barlo\v, 83 SW 145, 26 KyL 1076.
We submit the evidence in case at bar fairly shows,

by admissions of both father and son, that neither considered it a real indebtedness. The father had helped the
son when he was younger in business, later the son paid
father and mother ba·ck. Surely such dealings between
father and son, cannot be deemed and considered as actual and bona fide indebtedness by father to son.
The son testified: "I loaned !!J.Oney from father, when
I need it, when I was young in business. When I got older

and got in business for myself, I intended to help father
and mother back." This was exactly what he did, ac·cording to his own testimoney (Ab. 19-20). The father on this
point said:
"I _don't remember what my son had done for me before he came back from Honolulu.

I can't remember

where or when it was that I turned the note over to him.
I know immediately after he returned from Honolulu he

paid my wife's hospital bill.

I .could :not say how soon.

That was his mother. We, like other parents did a lot for
our ·children, they help us back later on. I hope we are
not different from other folks in that respect." _(Ab. 26.)
Under such set of facts, I submit the son would not
be permitted by any court to recover a judgment against
his father, and if that be true there was no valid consideration for this note.
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·Furthertnore,· thi~s 'note wa'S transfered after matu-rity
of the first installment thereof, which amount was unpaid
at the time. One who takes after maturity is not a bona
fide holder. 8 C. J. 344. One who takes an instrument
after maturity is not a holder in due course, but takes it
subject to all equities and defenses arising out of the paper
itself and attaching to it, or out of the traJnsaction with
reference to \vhich the paper was made. 3 R. C. L. 1945.
Equally there is no justifi·cation for counsel's· statement that "plaintiff later paid full value for the note," because all of the evidence of purported payments offered
subsequent to June 15, 1936, was excluded. (Ab. 17-18.)
Counsel says "even if Alfred J. Bell had told this
plaintiff all that he had known about it, yet plaintiff would
have been a bona fide purchaser for value under Section
61-1-57." We cannot agree.

Had Alfred J. Bell told to

his son all he knew, or what counsel claims to be the fact,
about this he would have said, "here is a note for $850.00
signed by Alfred ·J. Bell. It repre,gents the balance of the
purch~se

price on the land I sold to Jones. When Jones

got a Federal Land Bank loan on this Ian d, I signed a
~scale-down

agreement to take $150.00 as satisfaction in

full of the existing indebtedness from Jones to me. When
I signed that scale-down agreement, I represented to the
Federal Land Bank that the existing indebtedness was
only $400.00. It was in fact more than that, it was this
note, $850.00, in addition to the $400.00. This $850.00
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note was really a side-agreement between me and Jones,
which I said nothing about in the scale-dp'Y.n agreement
that I signed. Now you take this note, if you can collect it
you can have it." I submit that if plaintiff had thus been
told the facts, he would have "knowledge of such facts that
his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad
faith", as Section 61-1-57 provides.
Hence we submit that the court below made no error
in holdi·ng that plaintiff was not a bona fide holder for
value in due course.
On page 6, counsel attempts to justify the court's
finding that defendant owed plaintiff $1250.00 as the balance on land contract, by saying Alfred J. Bell so testified.
We submit that Alfred J. Bell did not so testify. If any
one so testified it was his ·counsel, to which leading question Bell merely assented.
I

But counsel fails to answer the important question on
this point which we raised in our main brief: If the existing indebtedness was $1250.00 (and not $400.00) then it
is apparent that when Alfred J. Bell signed the scale-down
agreement (scaling down to $150.00) he did so on condition, or at least with the understanding that appellant give
him (Bell) a note for $850.00. In other words Jones was
required by Bell to absorb $850.00 of the $1100.00 which
Alfred J. Bell really scaled down. For Bell agreed to take
$150.00 as settlement in full for the existing indebtedness
between them. That is the very reason why the $850.00
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note sued on is void, for such acts are against public
policy, as we show by the authorities i'n our main brief. It
was ·certainly equally viscious and equally misleading to
the F·ederal Land Bank.

If Bell had stated that the ex-

isting indebtedness was $1250.00, in his scale-down agreement, and had agreed to take $150.00 as settlement, then,
counsel admits that Bell could not take a note from Jones
for any part of the amount scaled down. But counsel argues that Bell is now in a more favored position, because
he misstated and misrepresented what the existing indebtedness was.
We do not believe the court should allow Alfred J.
Bell to do indirectly by misrepresentation what he could
not do directly. If he had correctly stated the amount of
the existing indebtedness and agreed ·to take $150.00 as
settlement, that ends it. He could not then have a valid
side agreement with debtor to pay any back part of the
amount scaled down.

Neither should he be allowed to

falsely state the amount of the existing indebtedness to be
$400.00, if it in fact was more; and then take a note from
creditor representing the difference between the actual
existing indebtedness and the amount which creditor Bell
·stated and represented it to be, in his signed scale-down
agreement.
Respectfully submitted,

LEON FONNESBECK,
Attorney for Defendant an.d Appe:ll'ant.
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